release: 2023.8.6

* providers/oauth2: fix CVE-2024-21637 (#8104)

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

* update changelog

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>
Co-authored-by: Jens L <jens@goauthentik.io>

.bumpversion.cfg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 [bumpversion]
-current_version = 2023.8.3
+current_version = 2023.8.6
 tag = True
 commit = True
 parse = (?P<major>\d+)\.(?P<minor>\d+)\.(?P<patch>\d+)

.github/workflows/ci-main.yml

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
+      - version-*
 
 env:
   POSTGRES_DB: authentik
@@ -184,6 +185,9 @@ jobs:
   build:
     needs: ci-core-mark
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     timeout-minutes: 120
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
@@ -229,6 +233,9 @@ jobs:
   build-arm64:
     needs: ci-core-mark
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     timeout-minutes: 120
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3

.github/workflows/ci-outpost.yml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
+      - version-*
 
 jobs:
   lint-golint:
@@ -63,6 +64,9 @@ jobs:
           - ldap
           - radius
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
         with:

.github/workflows/ci-web.yml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
+      - version-*
 
 jobs:
   lint-eslint:

.github/workflows/ci-website.yml

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
+      - version-*
 
 jobs:
   lint-prettier:

.github/workflows/release-next-branch.yml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ on:
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
+  # Needed to be able to push to the next branch
   contents: write
 
 jobs:

.github/workflows/release-publish.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ on:
 jobs:
   build-server:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v3
       - name: Set up QEMU
@@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ jobs:
             VERSION_FAMILY=${{ steps.ev.outputs.versionFamily }}
   build-outpost:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload contianer images to ghcr.io
+      packages: write
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:
@@ -96,6 +102,9 @@ jobs:
   build-outpost-binary:
     timeout-minutes: 120
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      # Needed to upload binaries to the release
+      contents: write
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:

.github/workflows/repo-stale.yml

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ on:
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
+  # Needed to update issues and PRs
   issues: write
-  pull-requests: write
 
 jobs:
   stale:

authentik/__init__.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 from os import environ
 from typing import Optional
 
-__version__ = "2023.8.3"
+__version__ = "2023.8.6"
 ENV_GIT_HASH_KEY = "GIT_BUILD_HASH"
 
 

authentik/flows/migrations/0026_alter_flow_options.py

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Generated by Django 4.2.6 on 2023-10-10 17:18
+
+from django.db import migrations
+
+
+class Migration(migrations.Migration):
+    dependencies = [
+        ("authentik_flows", "0025_alter_flowstagebinding_evaluate_on_plan_and_more"),
+    ]
+
+    operations = [
+        migrations.AlterModelOptions(
+            name="flow",
+            options={
+                "permissions": [
+                    ("export_flow", "Can export a Flow"),
+                    ("inspect_flow", "Can inspect a Flow's execution"),
+                    ("view_flow_cache", "View Flow's cache metrics"),
+                    ("clear_flow_cache", "Clear Flow's cache metrics"),
+                ],
+                "verbose_name": "Flow",
+                "verbose_name_plural": "Flows",
+            },
+        ),
+    ]

authentik/flows/migrations/0027_auto_20231028_1424.py

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Generated by Django 4.2.6 on 2023-10-28 14:24
+
+from django.apps.registry import Apps
+from django.db import migrations
+from django.db.backends.base.schema import BaseDatabaseSchemaEditor
+
+
+def set_oobe_flow_authentication(apps: Apps, schema_editor: BaseDatabaseSchemaEditor):
+    from guardian.shortcuts import get_anonymous_user
+
+    Flow = apps.get_model("authentik_flows", "Flow")
+    User = apps.get_model("authentik_core", "User")
+
+    db_alias = schema_editor.connection.alias
+
+    users = User.objects.using(db_alias).exclude(username="akadmin")
+    try:
+        users = users.exclude(pk=get_anonymous_user().pk)
+    # pylint: disable=broad-except
+    except Exception:  # nosec
+        pass
+
+    if users.exists():
+        Flow.objects.filter(slug="initial-setup").update(authentication="require_superuser")
+
+
+class Migration(migrations.Migration):
+    dependencies = [
+        ("authentik_flows", "0026_alter_flow_options"),
+    ]
+
+    operations = [
+        migrations.RunPython(set_oobe_flow_authentication),
+    ]

authentik/providers/oauth2/tests/test_authorize.py

@@ -85,6 +85,25 @@ class TestAuthorize(OAuthTestCase):
             )
             OAuthAuthorizationParams.from_request(request)
 
+    def test_blocked_redirect_uri(self):
+        """test missing/invalid redirect URI"""
+        OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=create_test_flow(),
+            redirect_uris="data:local.invalid",
+        )
+        with self.assertRaises(RedirectUriError):
+            request = self.factory.get(
+                "/",
+                data={
+                    "response_type": "code",
+                    "client_id": "test",
+                    "redirect_uri": "data:localhost",
+                },
+            )
+            OAuthAuthorizationParams.from_request(request)
+
     def test_invalid_redirect_uri_empty(self):
         """test missing/invalid redirect URI"""
         provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(

authentik/providers/oauth2/tests/test_token_pkce.py

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+"""Test token view"""
+from base64 import b64encode, urlsafe_b64encode
+from hashlib import sha256
+
+from django.test import RequestFactory
+from django.urls import reverse
+
+from authentik.core.models import Application
+from authentik.core.tests.utils import create_test_admin_user, create_test_flow
+from authentik.flows.challenge import ChallengeTypes
+from authentik.lib.generators import generate_id
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.constants import GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.models import AuthorizationCode, OAuth2Provider
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.tests.utils import OAuthTestCase
+
+
+class TestTokenPKCE(OAuthTestCase):
+    """Test token view"""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        super().setUp()
+        self.factory = RequestFactory()
+        self.app = Application.objects.create(name=generate_id(), slug="test")
+
+    def test_pkce_missing_in_token(self):
+        """Test full with pkce"""
+        flow = create_test_flow()
+        provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=flow,
+            redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
+            access_code_validity="seconds=100",
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
+        state = generate_id()
+        user = create_test_admin_user()
+        self.client.force_login(user)
+        challenge = generate_id()
+        header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
+        # Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
+        self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
+            data={
+                "response_type": "code",
+                "client_id": "test",
+                "state": state,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+                "code_challenge": challenge,
+                "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
+        )
+        code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content.decode(),
+            {
+                "component": "xak-flow-redirect",
+                "type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
+                "to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.post(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
+            data={
+                "grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
+                "code": code.code,
+                # Missing the code_verifier here
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+            },
+            HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
+        )
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content,
+            {"error": "invalid_request", "error_description": "The request is otherwise malformed"},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
+
+    def test_pkce_correct_s256(self):
+        """Test full with pkce"""
+        flow = create_test_flow()
+        provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=flow,
+            redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
+            access_code_validity="seconds=100",
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
+        state = generate_id()
+        user = create_test_admin_user()
+        self.client.force_login(user)
+        verifier = generate_id()
+        challenge = (
+            urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest())
+            .decode("utf-8")
+            .replace("=", "")
+        )
+        header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
+        # Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
+        self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
+            data={
+                "response_type": "code",
+                "client_id": "test",
+                "state": state,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+                "code_challenge": challenge,
+                "code_challenge_method": "S256",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
+        )
+        code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content.decode(),
+            {
+                "component": "xak-flow-redirect",
+                "type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
+                "to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.post(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
+            data={
+                "grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
+                "code": code.code,
+                "code_verifier": verifier,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+            },
+            HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+
+    def test_pkce_correct_plain(self):
+        """Test full with pkce"""
+        flow = create_test_flow()
+        provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            client_id="test",
+            authorization_flow=flow,
+            redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
+            access_code_validity="seconds=100",
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
+        state = generate_id()
+        user = create_test_admin_user()
+        self.client.force_login(user)
+        verifier = generate_id()
+        header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
+        # Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
+        self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
+            data={
+                "response_type": "code",
+                "client_id": "test",
+                "state": state,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+                "code_challenge": verifier,
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.get(
+            reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
+        )
+        code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
+        self.assertJSONEqual(
+            response.content.decode(),
+            {
+                "component": "xak-flow-redirect",
+                "type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
+                "to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
+            },
+        )
+        response = self.client.post(
+            reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
+            data={
+                "grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
+                "code": code.code,
+                "code_verifier": verifier,
+                "redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
+            },
+            HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)

authentik/providers/oauth2/views/authorize.py

@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ PLAN_CONTEXT_PARAMS = "goauthentik.io/providers/oauth2/params"
 SESSION_KEY_LAST_LOGIN_UID = "authentik/providers/oauth2/last_login_uid"
 
 ALLOWED_PROMPT_PARAMS = {PROMPT_NONE, PROMPT_CONSENT, PROMPT_LOGIN}
+FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES = {"javascript", "data", "vbscript"}
 
 
 @dataclass(slots=True)
@@ -174,6 +175,10 @@ class OAuthAuthorizationParams:
         self.check_scope()
         self.check_nonce()
         self.check_code_challenge()
+        if self.request:
+            raise AuthorizeError(
+                self.redirect_uri, "request_not_supported", self.grant_type, self.state
+            )
 
     def check_redirect_uri(self):
         """Redirect URI validation."""
@@ -211,10 +216,9 @@ class OAuthAuthorizationParams:
                     expected=allowed_redirect_urls,
                 )
                 raise RedirectUriError(self.redirect_uri, allowed_redirect_urls)
-        if self.request:
-            raise AuthorizeError(
-                self.redirect_uri, "request_not_supported", self.grant_type, self.state
-            )
+        # Check against forbidden schemes
+        if urlparse(self.redirect_uri).scheme in FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES:
+            raise RedirectUriError(self.redirect_uri, allowed_redirect_urls)
 
     def check_scope(self):
         """Ensure openid scope is set in Hybrid flows, or when requesting an id_token"""

authentik/providers/oauth2/views/token.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from hashlib import sha256
 from re import error as RegexError
 from re import fullmatch
 from typing import Any, Optional
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 from django.http import HttpRequest, HttpResponse
 from django.utils import timezone
@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ from authentik.providers.oauth2.models import (
     RefreshToken,
 )
 from authentik.providers.oauth2.utils import TokenResponse, cors_allow, extract_client_auth
+from authentik.providers.oauth2.views.authorize import FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES
 from authentik.sources.oauth.models import OAuthSource
 from authentik.stages.password.stage import PLAN_CONTEXT_METHOD, PLAN_CONTEXT_METHOD_ARGS
 
@@ -204,6 +206,10 @@ class TokenParams:
                 ).from_http(request)
                 raise TokenError("invalid_client")
 
+        # Check against forbidden schemes
+        if urlparse(self.redirect_uri).scheme in FORBIDDEN_URI_SCHEMES:
+            raise TokenError("invalid_request")
+
         self.authorization_code = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(code=raw_code).first()
         if not self.authorization_code:
             LOGGER.warning("Code does not exist", code=raw_code)
@@ -221,7 +227,10 @@ class TokenParams:
             raise TokenError("invalid_grant")
 
         # Validate PKCE parameters.
-        if self.code_verifier:
+        if self.authorization_code.code_challenge:
+            # Authorization code had PKCE but we didn't get one
+            if not self.code_verifier:
+                raise TokenError("invalid_request")
             if self.authorization_code.code_challenge_method == PKCE_METHOD_S256:
                 new_code_challenge = (
                     urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(self.code_verifier.encode("ascii")).digest())

authentik/providers/saml/processors/metadata.py

@@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ class MetadataProcessor:
             entity_descriptor, f"{{{NS_SAML_METADATA}}}IDPSSODescriptor"
         )
         idp_sso_descriptor.attrib["protocolSupportEnumeration"] = NS_SAML_PROTOCOL
+        if self.provider.verification_kp:
+            idp_sso_descriptor.attrib["WantAuthnRequestsSigned"] = "true"
 
         signing_descriptor = self.get_signing_key_descriptor()
         if signing_descriptor is not None:

authentik/providers/saml/tests/test_metadata.py

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from authentik.lib.xml import lxml_from_string
 from authentik.providers.saml.models import SAMLBindings, SAMLPropertyMapping, SAMLProvider
 from authentik.providers.saml.processors.metadata import MetadataProcessor
 from authentik.providers.saml.processors.metadata_parser import ServiceProviderMetadataParser
-from authentik.sources.saml.processors.constants import NS_MAP
+from authentik.sources.saml.processors.constants import NS_MAP, NS_SAML_METADATA
 
 
 class TestServiceProviderMetadataParser(TestCase):
@@ -55,6 +55,24 @@ class TestServiceProviderMetadataParser(TestCase):
         schema = etree.XMLSchema(etree.parse("schemas/saml-schema-metadata-2.0.xsd"))  # nosec
         self.assertTrue(schema.validate(metadata))
 
+    def test_schema_want_authn_requests_signed(self):
+        """Test metadata generation with WantAuthnRequestsSigned"""
+        cert = create_test_cert()
+        provider = SAMLProvider.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            authorization_flow=self.flow,
+            verification_kp=cert,
+        )
+        Application.objects.create(
+            name=generate_id(),
+            slug=generate_id(),
+            provider=provider,
+        )
+        request = self.factory.get("/")
+        metadata = lxml_from_string(MetadataProcessor(provider, request).build_entity_descriptor())
+        idp_sso_descriptor = metadata.findall(f"{{{NS_SAML_METADATA}}}IDPSSODescriptor")[0]
+        self.assertEqual(idp_sso_descriptor.attrib["WantAuthnRequestsSigned"], "true")
+
     def test_simple(self):
         """Test simple metadata without Signing"""
         metadata = ServiceProviderMetadataParser().parse(load_fixture("fixtures/simple.xml"))

authentik/sources/ldap/sync/vendor/freeipa.py

@@ -47,9 +47,11 @@ class FreeIPA(BaseLDAPSynchronizer):
             return
         # For some reason, nsaccountlock is not defined properly in the schema as bool
         # hence we get it as a list of strings
-        _is_active = str(self._flatten(attributes.get("nsaccountlock", ["FALSE"])))
+        _is_locked = str(self._flatten(attributes.get("nsaccountlock", ["FALSE"])))
         # So we have to attempt to convert it to a bool
-        is_active = _is_active.lower() == "true"
+        is_locked = _is_locked.lower() == "true"
+        # And then invert it since freeipa saves locked and we save active
+        is_active = not is_locked
         if is_active != user.is_active:
             user.is_active = is_active
             user.save()

authentik/sources/ldap/tests/test_sync.py

@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ class LDAPSyncTests(TestCase):
             user_sync.sync_full()
             self.assertTrue(User.objects.filter(username="user0_sn").exists())
             self.assertFalse(User.objects.filter(username="user1_sn").exists())
+            self.assertFalse(User.objects.get(username="user-nsaccountlock").is_active)
 
     def test_sync_groups_ad(self):
         """Test group sync"""

blueprints/default/flow-oobe.yaml

@@ -85,6 +85,19 @@ entries:
   identifiers:
     name: default-oobe-password-usable
   model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
+- attrs:
+    expression: |
+      # This policy ensures that the setup flow can only be
+      # used one time
+      from authentik.flows.models import Flow, FlowAuthenticationRequirement
+      Flow.objects.filter(slug="initial-setup").update(
+          authentication=FlowAuthenticationRequirement.REQUIRE_SUPERUSER,
+      )
+      return True
+  id: policy-default-oobe-flow-set-authentication
+  identifiers:
+    name: default-oobe-flow-set-authentication
+  model: authentik_policies_expression.expressionpolicy
 - attrs:
     fields:
     - !KeyOf prompt-field-header
@@ -129,6 +142,7 @@ entries:
     evaluate_on_plan: true
     invalid_response_action: retry
     re_evaluate_policies: false
+  id: binding-login
   identifiers:
     order: 100
     stage: !KeyOf stage-default-authentication-login
@@ -144,3 +158,8 @@ entries:
     policy: !KeyOf policy-default-oobe-prefill-user
     target: !KeyOf binding-password-write
   model: authentik_policies.policybinding
+- identifiers:
+    order: 0
+    policy: !KeyOf policy-default-oobe-flow-set-authentication
+    target: !KeyOf binding-login
+  model: authentik_policies.policybinding

blueprints/system/bootstrap.yaml

@@ -42,9 +42,3 @@ entries:
       user: !KeyOf admin-user
     attrs:
       key: !Context token
-  - model: authentik_blueprints.blueprintinstance
-    identifiers:
-      metadata:
-        labels:
-          blueprints.goauthentik.io/system-bootstrap: "true"
-    state: absent

docker-compose.yml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ services:
     volumes:
       - redis:/data
   server:
-    image: ${AUTHENTIK_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/goauthentik/server}:${AUTHENTIK_TAG:-2023.8.3}
+    image: ${AUTHENTIK_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/goauthentik/server}:${AUTHENTIK_TAG:-2023.8.6}
     restart: unless-stopped
     command: server
     environment:
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ services:
       - postgresql
       - redis
   worker:
-    image: ${AUTHENTIK_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/goauthentik/server}:${AUTHENTIK_TAG:-2023.8.3}
+    image: ${AUTHENTIK_IMAGE:-ghcr.io/goauthentik/server}:${AUTHENTIK_TAG:-2023.8.6}
     restart: unless-stopped
     command: worker
     environment:

internal/constants/constants.go

@@ -29,4 +29,4 @@ func UserAgent() string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("authentik@%s", FullVersion())
 }
 
-const VERSION = "2023.8.3"
+const VERSION = "2023.8.6"

pyproject.toml

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ filterwarnings = [
 
 [tool.poetry]
 name = "authentik"
-version = "2023.8.3"
+version = "2023.8.6"
 description = ""
 authors = ["authentik Team <hello@goauthentik.io>"]
 

schema.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 openapi: 3.0.3
 info:
   title: authentik
-  version: 2023.8.3
+  version: 2023.8.6
   description: Making authentication simple.
   contact:
     email: hello@goauthentik.io

web/src/common/constants.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ export const SUCCESS_CLASS = "pf-m-success";
 export const ERROR_CLASS = "pf-m-danger";
 export const PROGRESS_CLASS = "pf-m-in-progress";
 export const CURRENT_CLASS = "pf-m-current";
-export const VERSION = "2023.8.3";
+export const VERSION = "2023.8.6";
 export const TITLE_DEFAULT = "authentik";
 export const ROUTE_SEPARATOR = ";";
 

website/docs/releases/2023/v2023.8.md

@@ -155,6 +155,18 @@ image:
 -   web: don't import entire SourceViewPage in flow and user interface (#6761)
 -   web: replace ampersand (#6737)
 
+## Fixed in 2023.8.4
+
+-   \*: fix [GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w](../security/GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w), Reported by [@devSparkle](https://github.com/devSparkle)
+
+## Fixed in 2023.8.5
+
+-   security: fix [CVE-2023-48228](../../security/CVE-2023-48228.md), Reported by [@Sapd](https://github.com/Sapd) (#7666)
+
+## Fixed in 2023.8.6
+
+-   providers/oauth2: fix [CVE-2024-21637](../../security/CVE-2024-21637.md), Reported by [@lauritzh](https://github.com/lauritzh) (#8104)
+
 ## API Changes
 
 #### What's New

website/docs/security/CVE-2023-48228.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# CVE-2023-48228
+
+_Reported by [@Sapd](https://github.com/Sapd)_
+
+## OAuth2: Insufficient PKCE check
+
+### Summary
+
+When initialising a OAuth2 flow with a `code_challenge` and `code_method` (thus requesting PKCE), the SSO provider (authentik) **must** check if there is a matching **and** existing `code_verifier` during the token step.
+
+authentik checks if the contents of code*verifier is matching \*\*\_ONLY*\*\* when it is provided. When it is left out completely, authentik simply accepts the token request with out it; even when the flow was started with a `code_challenge`.
+
+### Patches
+
+authentik 2023.8.5 and 2023.10.4 fix this issue.
+
+### Details
+
+The `code_verifier` is only checked when the user provides it. Note that in line 209 there is a check if the code_parameter is left out. But there is no check if the PKCE parameter simply was omitted WHEN the request was started with a `code_challenge_method`.
+
+This oversight likely did not stem from a coding error but from a misinterpretation of the RFC, where the backward compatibility section may be somewhat confusing.
+https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636#section-4.5
+RFC7636 explicitly says in Section 4.5:
+
+> The "code_challenge_method" is bound to the Authorization Code when
+> the Authorization Code is issued. That is the method that the token
+> endpoint MUST use to verify the "code_verifier".
+
+Section 5, Compatibility
+
+> Server implementations of this specification MAY accept OAuth2.0
+> clients that do not implement this extension. If the "code_verifier"
+> is not received from the client in the Authorization Request, servers
+> supporting backwards compatibility revert to the OAuth 2.0 [[RFC6749](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749)]
+> protocol without this extension.
+
+Section 5, Compatibility, allows server implementations of this specification to accept OAuth 2.0 clients that do not implement this extension. However, if a `code_verifier` is not received from the client in the Authorization Request, servers that support backward compatibility should revert to the standard OAuth 2.0 protocol sans this extension (including all steps).
+
+It should be noted that this does not mean that the `code_verifier` check can be disregarded at any point if the initial request included `code_challenge` or `code_challenge_method`. Since Authentik supports PKCE, it **MUST** verify the code_verifier as described in Section 4.5 **AND** fail if it was not provided.
+
+Ofc verification can be skipped if the original authorization request did not invoke PKCE (no `code_challenge_method` and no `code_challenge`).
+
+Failure to check the `code_verifier` renders the PKCE flow ineffective. This vulnerability particularly endangers public or hybrid clients, as their `code` is deemed non-confidential.
+
+While not explicitly stated in the standard, it is generally recommended that OAuth2 flows accepting public clients should enforce PKCE - at least when redirecting to a non HTTPS URL (like http or an app link).
+
+### Impact
+
+The vulnerability poses a high risk to both public and hybrid clients.
+When for example a mobile app implements oauth2, a malicious app can simply also register the same in-app-link (e.g. `mycoolapp://oauth2`) for the redirect callback URL, possibly receiving `code` during callback. With PKCE working, a malicious app would still receive a `code` but the `code` would not work without the correct unhashed code-challenge.
+This is especially problematic, because authentik claims to support PKCE, and a developer can expect that the proper checks are in place. Note that app-links cannot be protected by HTTPS or similar mechanisms.
+
+Note also that this vulnerability poses a threat to confidential clients. Many confidential clients act as a proxy for OAuth2 API requests, typically from mobile apps or single-page applications. These proxies relay `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method` (in auth request, which most libraries force and provide on default settings) and `code_verifier` in the token request unchanged and supplement the CLIENT_SECRET which only the relay knows. The relay can but does not have to check for an existing `code_verifier` as the standard does not define that PKCE can be ignored on confidential clients during the token request when the client requested PKCE during the authorization request.
+
+An attacker could potentially gain full access to the application. If the code grants access to an admin account, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of that application are compromised.
+
+### For more information
+
+If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
+
+-   Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)

website/docs/security/CVE-2024-21637.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# CVE-2024-21637
+
+_Reported by [@lauritzh](https://github.com/lauritzh)_
+
+## XSS in Authentik via JavaScript-URI as Redirect URI and form_post Response Mode
+
+### Summary
+
+Given an OAuth2 provider configured with allowed redirect URIs set to `*` or `.*`, an attacker can send an OAuth Authorization request using `response_mode=form_post` and setting `redirect_uri` to a malicious URI, to capture authentik's session token.
+
+### Patches
+
+authentik 2023.8.6 and 2023.10.6 fix this issue.
+
+### Impact
+
+The impact depends on the attack scenario. In the following I will describe the two scenario that were identified for Authentik.
+
+#### Redirect URI Misconfiguration
+
+While advising that this may cause security issues, Authentik generally allows wildcards as Redirect URI. Therefore, using a wildcard-only effectively allowing arbitrary URLS is possible misconfiguration that may be present in real-world instances.
+
+In such cases, unauthenticated and unprivileged attackers can perform the above described actions.
+
+### User with (only) App Administration Permissions
+
+A more likely scenario is an administrative user (e.g. a normal developer) having only permissions to manage applications.
+
+This relatively user could use the described attacks to perform a privilege escalation.
+
+### Workaround
+
+It is recommended to upgrade to the patched version of authentik. If not possible, ensure that OAuth2 providers do not use a wildcard (`*` or `.*`) value as allowed redirect URI setting. (This is _not_ exploitable if part of the redirect URI has a wildcard, for example `https://foo-.*\.bar\.com`)
+
+### For more information
+
+If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
+
+-   Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)

website/docs/security/GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w
+
+_Reported by [@devSparkle](https://github.com/devSparkle)_
+
+## Potential Installation takeover when default admin user is deleted
+
+### Summary
+
+In the affected versions, when the default admin user has been deleted, it is potentially possible for an attacker to set the password of the default admin user without any authentication.
+
+### Patches
+
+authentik 2023.8.4 and 2023.10.2 fix this issue, for other versions the workaround can be used.
+
+### Impact
+
+authentik uses a blueprint to create the default admin user, which can also optionally set the default admin users' password from an environment variable. When the user is deleted, the `initial-setup` flow used to configure authentik after the first installation becomes available again.
+
+### Workarounds
+
+Ensure the default admin user (Username `akadmin`) exists and has a password set. It is recommended to use a very strong password for this user, and store it in a secure location like a password manager. It is also possible to deactivate the user to prevent any logins as akadmin.
+
+### For more information
+
+If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
+
+-   Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)

website/sidebars.js

@@ -362,6 +362,9 @@ const docsSidebar = {
             },
             items: [
                 "security/policy",
+                "security/CVE-2024-21637",
+                "security/CVE-2023-48228",
+                "security/GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w",
                 "security/CVE-2023-39522",
                 "security/CVE-2023-36456",
                 "security/2023-06-cure53",